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This paper uses the large-scale Cranet data to explore the extent of non-standard working 
time across Europe and to highlight the contrasts and similarities between two different 
varieties of capitalism (coordinated market economies and liberal market economies). We 
explore variations in the extent of different forms of non-standard working time 
(overtime, shift working and weekend working) within these two different forms of 
capitalism, controlling for firm size, sector and the extent of employee voice. Overall, 
there was no strong link between the variety of capitalism and the use of overtime and 
weekend working though shift working showed a clear distinction between the two 
varieties of capitalism. Usage of non-standard working time in some service sectors was 
particularly high under both forms of capitalism and service sector activities had a 
particularly marked influence on the use of overtime in liberal market economies. 
Surprisingly, strong employee voice was associated with greater use of non-standard 
working time 
 
Keywords: non-standard working time; overtime; shift working; weekend working.  
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Working time is a key issue in modern work and employment relations. For many people, 
the time at which work takes place is irrelevant – for accountants, designers and 
computer programmers only the final deadline for the delivery of the services they 
provide matters. For others, particularly those engaged with the public, where their 
services are dependent on their availability or their production depends on access to 
goods or equipment, availability and working time are crucial. For yet a third group, 
flexibility is what matters: academics fit in the work to prepare papers around their 
teaching and administrative tasks. In all cases, work outside the normal working day is of 
increasing importance. However, this is unlikely to be the same in all economies and the 
extent of such work may vary between different forms of capitalism.   
 
It could be argued that firms operating in lightly regulated contexts are freer to redeploy 
people as and when managers choose, even if this is not in accordance with employee 
preferences. Conversely, the use of non-standard working time may be more attractive in 
more regulated contexts where flexible working hours may give firms more scope to 
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adjust relative workforce sizes without having to make premature hirings or 
redundancies. In contrast to these arguments for differences between different forms of 
capitalism, it may be that specific technology or customer needs may make non-standard 
working the norm in particular industries regardless of context.  In short, a comparative 
study of the relative incidence and nature of non-standard working time may tell us a lot 
about the distinguishing features of specific varieties of capitalism, and the strategic 
choices regarding HRM practices that are likely to be made by firms in different contexts. 
Given the evidence of distinctiveness of business systems found in the Cranet dataset 
when looking at other areas of HRM (Brewster et al. 2007; Brewster et al. 2004), it is 
important to explore whether differences between varieties of capitalism also exist in the 
area of non-standard working time. 
 
The paper explores these issues as follows. Firstly, it outlines the nature of non-standard 
working time and the ways in which non-standard working time might vary within the 
two different types of capitalism identified by Hall and Soskice (2001). The influence of 
differences in firm sizes, sectoral mix and the degree of employee voice within the 
different forms of capitalism is noted. Then we outline our methodology and measures. 
The results and a discussion of the results precede a conclusion outlining some of the 
implications of our findings.  
 
Flexibility and non-standard working time 
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Forms of Flexibility 
There are many different forms of workplace flexibility or, to use the terminology current 
in the US literature, contingent employment. Polivk and Nardone (1989:10) define 
„contingent‟ employment in broad terms as “any arrangement that differs from full-time, 
permanent, wage and salary employment”. These have generally been grouped under 
three headings: numerical (including contractual) flexibility, functional flexibility and 
temporal flexibility (Brewster 1998) and it is clear that the use of these forms varies 
between countries (Brewster, Mayne and Tregaskis, 1997; Raguram, London and Larsen, 
2001; Tregaskis and Brewster 2006).  
 
Numerical flexibility is the ability of organisations to adjust the size of the workforce 
through hiring, lay-offs and dismissals whilst the sub-category contractual flexibility 
concerns the nature of the employment relationship: whether indeed it is an employment 
relationship or maybe an individual contract for services, and whether it is permanent or 
short-term. Functional flexibility represents the ability of workers to do different tasks 
within the same organisation (Almond and Gonzalez, 2006; Wood et al. 2006). This may 
involve greater variety both in tasks and in decision making powers (Marsden 1999: 132). 
Temporal flexibility is used either to cover the employer‟s ability to alter total number of 
hours worked or to refer to working time which occurs outside the standard working day, 
week, month or year. It is temporal flexibility and, in particular, the second of these 
definitions of temporal flexibility that is our focus here. Admittedly, the most common 
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form of flexible working time is part-time work, but as this may or may not be worked 
outside “normal” working hours, it is not considered separately here1.  
 
Standardised working arrangements were introduced with the industrial revolution and 
have applied in developed economies, for most of the time since then, to a majority of 
production and service workers, though not to many workers in such areas as agriculture, 
emergency services and parts of the service sector such as hotels. Standard working 
patterns are part of a broader social consensus involving synchronisation with leisure and 
educational time. Recently, however, driven by the increasing demands for 
competitiveness, firms have had to respond to changes in demand through the remaking 
of production and by altering the way working time is used (e.g. moving from fixed to 
more flexible schedules). In the service sector, there are growing demands for services 
such as retailing (Richbell and Kite, 2007) to be available to the public for much longer 
time periods and, in some cases, on a “twenty-four/ seven” basis (Kreitzman, 1997; 
Wilson et al 2005).   
 
The literature on working time concentrates on two main issues: the overall duration of 
work (Lee, McCann and Messenger, 2007) and the times of the day or night during which 
it takes place (Berg et al. 2004). Non-standard working time (hereafter NSWT) is work 
outside of the “normal” working day. Of course, the normal working day varies with 
country and context, but standard hours are defined normally in terms of the Western 
office based 8 hours per day, Monday-Friday, during daylight (McOrmond, 2004). 
                                                 
1
 For more on the specific issues pertaining to part time work see, for example, Ackers and Al-Sawad (2006) and Harris (2002). 
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NSWT falls outside this standard day/week. The move to NSWT was emphasised by 
Boisard et al (2002) who, drawing on a survey of the European Union‟s then 15 member 
countries, revealed that standard day work is now undertaken by only a minority of the 
workforce. Typical elements of NSWT are overtime, shift working and weekend 
working.  
 
Overtime: Supiot (2001) argues that, historically-speaking, the primary form of temporal 
flexibility has been in the form of overtime.  Overtime can be defined as hours worked in 
addition to the normal working day/week, sometimes paid at a multiple of the standard 
rate, though much work in NSWT is unpaid (particularly among professionals and 
managers, where non-standard working is driven by company norms and/or individual 
ambition).  This means that whilst employers may have to spend more on pay, they do 
not have to renegotiate wage rates (Marsden 1999), nor face an increase in indirect wage 
related costs (e.g. pensions, other benefits).  Overtime is commonly regulated through 
restricting the total number of hours that may be worked within a week and through the 
requirement for some degree of prior authorisation. 
 
Shift working: Survey evidence from Boisard et al (2002) showed nearly 20% of 
European Union workers involved in shift work, or systems in which work is carried out 
at set times of the day or night outside the normal working day and where individuals 
may rotate between different work time patterns. Shift work was established either to 
make greater use of expensive plant or property or to provide services on a continuous 
basis. Originally shift working tended to follow simple patterns but the advent of 
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computerisation meant that managers could institute quite complicated arrangements with 
varying and more flexible patterns of work (Brewster 1998). Competitive pressures have 
forced firms to find ways of enhancing output without increasing overall staff numbers or 
when cutting them (Williams and Adam-Smith 2006: 229). 
 
Weekend working: A specific form of NSWT is weekend working. The rationale is the 
same as for other forms of NSWT (Hollinshead et al. 1999; Gall 2003).  Although 
weekend working may be negotiated by individual employees in response to personal 
circumstances, it is most likely to be driven by “business needs” (Hollinshead 1999: 483). 
 
Flexibility, NSWT and Work/non-work Integration 
 
Moves away from standard day work impact on work/non-work integration. Changes to 
working time may be either beneficial or disadvantageous for the individuals concerned. 
On the one hand, adjustment in working time may allow for better work/non-work 
balance, and for a more effective response to the personal needs of individual employees 
(Martin 2006). On the other hand, evidence from Europe suggests that moves to non-
standard working in the form of shifts or irregular hours lead to higher levels of stress and 
general fatigue (Boisard 2003). Working time adjustments may weaken the individual 
positions of employees, and make it harder for them to resist further redefinitions 
(Marsden 1999). Berg et al (2005) argue for a greater focus on the issue of control over 
working time and for employees to have some control of the working relationship. 
Evidence from Cousins and Tang (2004) shows such control is possible but is spread 
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unevenly throughout Europe, with „negotiated flexibility‟ in the Netherlands giving 
workers greater control over working time. Wilson et al. (2005), aware of the impact on 
work/non-work balance, focus on family involvement in the training of shift workers and 
the exploration of social coping strategies.  
 
Working time is central to many employment relationships. The nature of NSWT in 
particular is linked to the degree of general flexibility in working arrangements, and 
relations within and beyond the firm. The relative ability of firms to expand the extent of 
NSWT is bound up with the prevailing labour market traditions, the law and custom. Yet, 
in the growing body of comparative literature on capitalism, work and employment 
relations (for example Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Lane and Wood, 2009), the 
issue of NSWT is a relatively neglected one. 
 
Varieties of capitalism and working time 
 
Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation in the literature on comparative 
capitalisms; seeking to link dominant inter- and intra- firm practices with particular 
national institutional configurations and the nature of relationships between key actors 
and stakeholders and searching for clusters of countries in which the same factors 
predominate (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999). A 
common distinction is drawn between, on the one hand, the stakeholder or coordinated 
varieties of capitalism, such as those encountered in continental North Western Europe 
and the developed economies of the Far East and, on the other, the liberal market or 
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shareholder orientated varieties found in the Anglo-American economies (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000; Almond and Gonzalez 2006). The former, the coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) are characterised in part by more cooperative forms of work 
and employment relations, with high levels of delegation to employees and 
interdependence between managers and employees (Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 
2001). The latter, the liberal market economies (LMEs), are characterised by lower levels 
of delegation and interdependence (Hall and Soskice 2001).     
 
There are limitations to such dichotomous approaches to varieties of capitalism, in 
particularly in relation to the CME category, which encompasses quite a disparate set of 
countries.  Amable (2003) would divide CME countries into two distinct groups 
(continental European and social democratic) but he acknowledges that they have much 
in common in key areas particularly pertinent to this analysis. Both groups have common 
legal systems and centralised bargaining and, hence, a great deal more protection for 
employees, including issues such as the usage of overtime and other non-standard 
working practices (Djankov et al. 2003; Amable 2003; La Porta et al. 1998). Hence, we 
have opted to remain with a dichotomous approach to varieties of capitalism, whilst 
recognising the relevance of multi-model approaches for understanding differences in 
firm level practices in a range of other areas (Brewster et al. 2007). 
 
We would also stress two important caveats. First, we recognise that a minority of firms 
in both varieties of capitalism may opt to stand outside the majority approach for that 
form of capitalism and behave more like firms from the opposite paradigm. Indeed, 
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recent research points to the coexistence of alternative production paradigms within 
specific national contexts, even if clear differences between nations remain (Brewster et 
al. 2006).  Second, we recognise that the variety of capitalism is not the sole determinant 
of NSWT and, following Berg et al (2004), note that other key issues affecting the usage 
of NSWT include government regulations, informal norms, the state of the external 
labour market, the sector within which a firm is operating (often tied to sector specific 
technologies), firm size, and the countervailing power of employees via mechanisms for 
participation.  
 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) 
Within coordinated markets, firms may offset the numerical flexibility problems 
associated with a high degree of employment protection through attaining numerical 
flexibility by other means such as adjusting the time worked (Tregaskis et al. 1998; 
Almond and Gonzalez 2006).  Regulations in these economies generally restrict the use 
of numerical flexibility and focus on functional and temporal flexibility. In the latter case, 
legislation on alternative working time arrangements (Wood et al. 2006) discourages the 
use of some practices (such as extensive overtime) and encourages the greater use of 
others (such as adjustment of the working week, particularly in terms of shortening it in 
order to preserve jobs in times of reduced demand (Harcourt and Wood 2007).   In 
contexts where employee rights are protected more clearly under the law, workers have 
an external point of reference which can help protect their rights, make them more aware 
of what can be expected, and hence, better able to cope with changes in working 
circumstances (Marsden 1999). Berg et al (2004) found that within CMEs, non-standard 
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working arrangements are more likely to be negotiated; hence, the nature and form of 
non-standard working is likely to be related to union strength and bargaining 
arrangements.  In practice, atypical working hours in these economies may often take the 
form of an annualised contract specifying total working hours and permitting variable 
working time; the latter may or may not take place outside of normal working hours.   
 
Why would non-standard working time be less likely to occur in CMEs?   Whilst it is not 
disputed that a degree of flexibility is built into centralised agreements that characterise 
employment relations across large areas of the economy in CMEs, any major or 
systematic adjustment in working time away from a commonly considered “norm” would 
require agreement at some level. Employees and their collectives are in a stronger 
position vis-à-vis managers in CMEs (Hall and Soskice 2001: 57).  Union desires to 
promote “good” job creation and, hence, enlarge the pool of potential members (Hyman 
2006; Gall 2003) are likely to mean that, in contexts where they are relatively strong, 
they are unlikely to be favourably disposed to agree to the systematic use of overtime or 
complex shift working, or agree to the imposition of practices that may facilitate 
redundancies.  The systematic usage of overtime in specific sectors associated with poor 
quality working conditions may also be unattractive to employees and their 
representatives. Of course, individual workers may, in specific cases, welcome the 
chance for additional earnings via overtime but, given the above mentioned concerns, it is 
more likely that they will be hostile or lukewarm to it.  Quite simply, to an individual 
working overtime it may be beneficial to her/him (in terms of extra pay or being seen to 
be more diligent), but it can have collective consequences (such as leaner staffing and a 
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creeping expectation that workers can and should work longer).  This would mitigate the 
use of overtime in contexts where unions are stronger, or indeed, where workers have 
other effective forms of collective representation at the workplace. 
 
In contrast, employees may well be inclined to agree to shorter working time, if the 
alternative is large scale redundancies (Harcourt and Wood 2007; Wood et al. 2006).   
Many firms operating in CMEs base their competitiveness on high quality incrementally 
innovative production that requires workers actively to invest in developing themselves 
in organisationally specific ways that benefit their employer whilst restricting their 
marketability(Hall and Soskice 2001).  This is more likely to emerge in contexts where 
jobs are more secure and a greater degree of meaning is vested in working life (Sayer 
2006: 209-212; Harcourt and Wood 2007).  Finally, in areas covered by collective 
bargaining, employers are less able to adjust terms and conditions of work. This means 
that the ad hoc introduction of overtime or changes in working hours between rounds of 
annual collective bargaining will be more difficult (Wood et al. 2006: 176-180).   
 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) 
Within liberal market economies, firms are rather more likely to make use of 
redundancies, since restriction on the owners‟ rights to terminate employment are more 
limited. Light regulation allows firms to make greater use of overtime and thus save on 
recruitment and induction costs. Why are LME-based firms more likely to adopt non-
standard working time than their CME-based counterparts?  One reason is that the 
relative weakness of unions and collective bargaining in LMEs allows employers to 
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adjust the terms and conditions of employment more easily (Hall and Soskice 2001: 57).  
Whilst unions may have an interest in allowing some flexibility in working time to avoid 
redundancies, the widespread usage of overtime would constrain future job creation and 
may detract from the quality of working life. Conversely, some employees may favour 
non-standard working time owing to the difficulty of balancing family commitments in 
contexts where the state provision for childcare is poor or in order to secure more pay.  
Any additional pay for overtime is likely to promote a more instrumental approach to 
work and this is  more likely to be encountered in lightly regulated environments (Sayer 
2006).  Furthermore, in the civil law systems associated with LMEs, employee rights 
generally are weaker, both in formal law and in their enforcement (Djankov et al. 2003; 
Harcourt and Wood 2004).  Inter alia, there are fewer restrictions on employers making 
use of NSWT. 
 
There is considerable empirical evidence to support this rationale. The average annual 
hours worked in liberal markets is higher than in coordinated ones (OECD 2003). The 
hours worked in typical LMEs such as the USA, Canada and the UK are higher than 
those in typical CMEs such as Austria and Germany. Where temporal flexibility is used 
in LMEs, work outside of normal working hours will most typically take the form of 
overtime (Ackers and Al-Sawad 2006), in contrast to the annualised contracts of the 
CMEs.  In the UK, the EU working time regulations, that limit overall hours worked, 
were adopted with a UK-specific concession that permits workers to opt out of a 48 hour 
maximum working week, through undertaking overtime or longer shifts (Ewing 2003; 
Williams and Adams-Smith 2006). This concession would suggest that the UK system is 
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more dependent on non-standard working than the CMEs, who generally adopted the 
ruling. Kenner (2004: 591) notes that the opt-out allows the UK to maintain its 
„essentially deregulatory approach to working time‟ particularly in the private sector 
where the level of collective bargaining is lower. Indeed, formal working time in Britain 
is the longest in the EU (Ewing 2003).  
 
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Of course, as noted earlier, any differences between the extent of NSWT in CMEs and 
LMEs will be mediated by a variety of factors. In our analysis, we consider firm size, 
industrial sector and the strength of employee voice.  We use firm size only as a control 
variable as the truncated nature of the size variable in our data set (discussed below) 
means that it is inappropriate to undertake a detailed analysis of the effects of size. We 
identify three hypotheses for examination. 
 
Variations in NSWT 
H1: Overtime and shift working are more common in LMEs than CMEs.  
 
It appears likely that within liberal market economies, the usage of overtime and shift 
working will be higher than it will be in the CMEs.  This reflects the greater ability of 
employers to adjust the terms and conditions of employment, including fewer legal 
restrictions on the usage of overtime and weaker unions, that make it easier to deploy 
Nswtrevisedsubmission 16  
workers “unfettered by time constraints” (Hyman 2006: 192) as well as the greater 
likelihood of more instrumental attitudes to work. Employees are more likely to accept 
working under less favourable conditions if work is primarily seen as a means to material 
rewards (Sayer 2006).  
 
Sectoral differences in NSWT 
H2a: Sector will partially determine the extent of NSWT. 
H2b: The service sector is more likely to be an influence on the extent of NSWT in LMEs 
than CMEs. 
 
What constitutes “normal” working time varies from sector to sector. Overtime and work 
at unsocial hours are common within many areas of the service sector (Williams and 
Adams-Smith 2006). As noted earlier, some sectors (health, emergency services, hotels) 
are inherently twenty-four hour operations and therefore, in respect of NSWT, are 
unlikely to be affected by the variety of capitalism in which they operate. In other sectors 
there is likely to be more variation between different forms of capitalism. Firstly, within 
the service sector, certain types of personal services (e.g. fast food, call centres) are more 
likely to operate after hours than others (conventional retailing); often the former tend to 
be relatively low value added (Hyman 2006).   A body of literature suggests that low 
value added personal services are likely to be a particularly prominent feature of 
economic life in LMEs (Hyman 2006; Harcourt and Wood 2007; Thelen 2001).  
Secondly, it is more economic to operate certain types of machinery on a continuous or 
near continuous basis, reflecting either technology or the nature of demand and delivery 
Nswtrevisedsubmission 17  
(e.g. energy provision); there is little in the literature to suggest such sectoral effects will 
be more pronounced in a specific variety of capitalism.  Finally, given that weekend 
working may represent a product of technology (as noted earlier, some forms of 
machinery may function best under continuous operation) or industry (for example, 
entertainment), we would not expect a significant variation in the incidence of weekend 
working according to variety of capitalism. 
 
Employee Voice and NSWT 
H3: The presence of collective employee voice influences the  extent of NSWT: overtime 
is more likely to be encountered where representative employee voice (collective 
bargaining and/or works councils) is absent or weak as in LMEs. 
 
We noted that certain forms of NSWT are more likely in contexts where employee voice 
is relatively weak. In other words, effective employee voice mechanisms (via collective 
bargaining and/or works councils) are likely to discourage the usage of overtime. If 
working longer is unattractive then workers are likely to exercise voice to deter it. This 
does not mean that all workers will necessarily be hostile to overtime in all cases. They 
may welcome the opportunity for additional earnings, or to contribute to organisational 
survival – and hence safeguard their jobs in hard times.  However, unions are unlikely to 
press for overtime working at the collective bargaining table, and may oppose it, either 
when such working is unpopular per se with their constituents, or where it may facilitate 
redundancies or generally leaner staffing.  This means that it is likely that employee voice 
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will mitigate the usage of overtime. Hence, it is worth interrogating the link between 
NSWT and employee voice.   
 
Data and method 
 
The data used to test these hypotheses are taken from the Cranet survey. This survey 
contains evidence on human resource management and industrial relations within private 
and public sector organisations in 22 European countries as well as others (Brewster et al 
2004). For the purpose of this analysis, we use the 2003/4, survey and focus on data 
relating to the private sector (which includes a number of „public sector‟ activities which 
have been outsourced to private sector providers). Five European countries fitting easily 
into the liberal market and co-ordinated market economy categories are selected as being 
the most appropriate, with the UK being used as the liberal market economy and 
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark used as appropriate examples of co-ordinated 
market economies. These four countries, which we take as representative of CMEs, all 
fall into Whitley‟s (1999: 43-44) “collaborative” category.    
 
The survey targets the most senior HRM professional within the establishment and covers 
a wide range of matters relating to company policies and practices in the HRM area. The 
data for each country is broadly representative with respect to proportion of industrial 
sectors and numbers employed (full technical details are provided by Brewster et al., 
2004). In the five countries used, the companies surveyed were those recorded as having 
more than 200 employees. Thus our analysis excludes most SMEs and is an analysis of 
Nswtrevisedsubmission 19  
the characteristics of larger firms. A very small number of SMEs are included where the 
firms responding reported smaller numbers of employees than those shown in the 
sampling frame. Whilst, as we noted earlier, we include size as a control variable in our 
analysis, the exclusion of almost all SMEs from the data set limits the extent to which we 
can examine the effects of size. 
 
The major thrust of the empirical analysis is to establish or confirm some of the major 
determinants of non-standard working by testing the specific hypotheses outlined above. 
Within the Cranet survey, data are recorded for three types of NSWT (overtime, shift 
working and weekend working). For each type of NSWT, the questionnaire asks each 
firm for an estimate of the proportion of employees undertaking that kind of working 
arrangement. Although the use of one respondent per firm is unsatisfactory for studies of 
a small number of firms, it is used widely as a method of collecting data in large scale 
surveys. Using block stepwise regression, each one of the three measures of NSWT was 
used as the dependent variable in three regression models estimated using ordinary least 
squares. 
 
The independent variables were selected so as to enable testing of the hypotheses 
outlined earlier. First, a dummy is included to separate the CME countries from the 
reference category of the UK liberal market economy. This controls for differences 
across the varieties of capitalism as well as allowing hypothesis 1 to be tested. Next, a set 
of dummy variables is created separating the data into 16 different industries, metal 
manufacturing being used as the reference category, thus enabling both elements of 
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hypothesis 2 to be explored. Finally, since Brewster et al (2007) established a strong 
relationship between employee voice mechanisms and HRM strategies, a dichotomous 
(dummy) variable is included to reflect the use of employee voice. The dummy separates 
those firms where communication to management takes place through collective voice 
mechanisms (i.e. works councils or trade union representatives) and those where such 
forms of communication are absent. This dummy variable facilitates the testing of 
hypotheses 3. A continuous variable is included to reflect the size of an organisation 
measured by the total number of employees. As noted above, it is used as a control 
variable.  
 
Analyses are based on responses from 1530 companies in the five selected countries, the 
response rates to the survey were, for each country, as follows: UK 13.5%, Germany 
18.3%, Austria 15.6%, Sweden 22.5% and Denmark 18.9%. A typical company (mode) 
had 450 employees with over 90 per cent of them working on a full-time basis. Tables 1 
and 2 report the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables by country and for the 
independent variables respectively. It is worth noting that within the respondent 
companies just under a half were drawn from the manufacturing sector. 
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The extent of NSWT within these companies is summarised in Table 3. It should be 
noted these are not exclusive categories and that companies reporting use of overtime 
might also report use of shift working and weekend working. 
 
<TAKE IN TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>  
 
NSWT was used by a majority of the companies. Virtually all firms (89 per cent) used 
overtime; shift working (71 per cent of companies) and weekend working (60 per cent of 
companies) were less common. These data confirm the importance of NSWT in the 
economies of the five selected countries. Indeed, in one fifth of the companies more than 
50 per cent of the employees were working overtime and/or shift working. 
 
The models outlined in the methods section were then estimated and the findings are 
reported below in Table 4.  
 
<TAKE IN TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Hypothesis 1 
In our first hypothesis, we suggested that specific forms of NSWT – overtime and shift 
work - would be more common in liberal market economies, reflecting both lighter 
regulation and weaker enforcement of any laws governing the extent of working time. It 
was tested by estimating overtime and shift work as functions of the explanatory 
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variables, including the CME dummy. The analysis was also run for weekend working 
but differences were not expected. 
 
On first inspection, it appears that overtime is more prevalent in LMEs. In the combined 
data set the CME dummy is negative (-4.16) and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that 
once controls have been introduced for size, industry and employee voice there is less 
overtime within CME firms. However, it is difficult to support this finding since virtually 
none of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. 
It will be noted there is a very low R-squared result (0.03).  This rather inconclusive 
finding in relation to overtime may arise from the fact that the term overtime is often used 
in a broad and sweeping manner, when closer scrutiny reveals that it encompasses a wide 
range of practices.  These can vary from fully negotiated (and limited) overtime closely 
governed by collective agreements and/or law, to arbitrarily imposed increases in 
working hours that are disruptive to life outside work. Overtime, of this latter kind, could 
be defined as work both beyond the normal pre-agreed minimum working time and 
occurring outside the common social practice regarding working hours (e.g. the 9 to 5 
working day).  
 
The results relating to shift work are much stronger with an R-squared of 0.20 in the 
model combining data from the two different types of economy (Table 3). The negative 
coefficient (-4.15), which is highly significant (p <0.01), indicates shift work is less 
typical of CMEs and this confirms that part of our first hypothesis. It is a particularly 
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strong result as the relationship appears significant even though we have introduced 
controls for size, industry and employee voice. 
 
To complete the picture, the extent of weekend working does not appear to vary between 
the two different types of economy since the CME coefficient is not significant, even at 
the 10 per cent level. This is further confirmed by the raw data where the difference 
between the two economies is very small (Table 5).   
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
 Hypothesis 2 
 
Our second hypothesis explored the relationship between NSWT and sectoral mix. There 
are indeed marked variations in the proportions of NSWT between sectors (Table 6). 
Overtime was associated particularly with transport, building and other manufacturing 
but also with public administration. Shift work was a particular feature of the three 
manufacturing sectors and the health service. An important role for weekend working 
appeared in sectors with a number of continuous processes (chemicals) and those where 
consumer demand at weekends is a characteristic (retail, transport, personal services and 
health). Overall the initial part our second hypothesis of sectoral variation was confirmed. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
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However, with regard to the second part of hypothesis 2, it was clear that the relationship 
between NSWT, sector and economy type was more complex and hidden within the 
combined data set, hence the models were re-estimated separately for LMEs and CMEs, 
with the results reported below in Table 7.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
 
Services represent an extremely broad area of economic activity, ranging from public 
services (in this data set provided through private sector providers), advanced high 
technology support services and financial services, through to low value added frontline 
services. 
 
In the case of overtime, four service coefficients have a significant influence (p<0.01) on 
the amount of overtime undertaken in LMEs compared with only two in CMEs. This 
confirms hypothesis 2 in relation to overtime. Surprisingly, the significant sectoral mix 
coefficients in every case reduce the amount of overtime in LMEs but increase it in 
CMEs. We note particularly the contrasting influence of banking and finance in the two 
categories. A more parsimonious model distinguishing only between services and all 
other sectors produced similar results with overtime as the dependent variable 
(admittedly with very low R squares). Again, in LMEs, services showed a negative 
impact on overtime whilst in CMEs the impact was positive (both p < 0.01) 
 
The influence of sectors on shift working was the opposite of that expected. At the 0.01 
level, in LMEs only one service sector variable had a significant influence on the extent 
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of shift working whereas no less than four service sector variables had an influence in 
CMEs. Quite clearly, the service sector is not more likely to be an influence on the extent 
of shift working in LMEs than in CMEs. It is worth noting that the presence of banking 
and finance in both LMEs and CMEs reduced the amount of shift work. We would 
tentatively suggest that what is happening here is that flexibility is being achieved 
through the use of part time employees rather than making use of shift working amongst 
the full time employees. Retail and distribution and other services also had below average 
shift working and therefore, as expected, reduced the incidence of shift working.  
 
The results in relation to weekend working, like those for shift working, were the opposite 
of those expected. Two significant service sector variables had an important influence in 
LMEs but no less than four service sector variables were important in CMEs. Where the 
coefficients appeared important in both forms of capitalism, they worked in the same 
direction. Companies in the retail and transport sectors were strongly associated with 
weekend working under both forms of capitalism, whereas health and personal services 




Hypothesis 3 suggested that NSWT may be correlated with collective employee voice 
and, in particular, that overtime will be more likely to be found where employee voice is 
absent. Although it can be argued that the relationship between employee voice and the 
dependent variables is more complex than the relationship suggested by this type of 
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model (it is more complementary than causal), a negative relationship should still be 
revealed. However, in the combined data set, employee voice shows a positive 
association with overtime, shift work and weekend working (all p < 0.01).  
 
This finding is particularly robust in that it appears in all the models (at varying levels of 
significance) except for the presence of overtime in CMEs. Identical results were 
obtained in the more parsimonious model (not shown here) using two sectors rather than 
fourteen.  Both weekend work and shift work constitute mechanisms to redefine the 
working day, rather than simply extend it, as is the case with overtime. Consequently we 
largely found that collective voice was positively correlated with NSWT. Our overall 
expectation that collective voice would act to reduce NSWT was not supported.  
 
Why would this be the case? First, it may be that unions are simply lukewarm to NSWT – 
even if it has potentially negative consequences in terms of employment, it is not a 
pressing issue when compared to security, core pay and associated conditions.   Second, 
Attitudes to NSWT may be positive in cases where such flexible working reflects the 
increasing importance of work/life balance issues. Third, it may be that, with the rise of 
more instrumental attitudes to work, employees are increasingly prepared to work longer 
for more money, even if they recognise the risks created by systematic overtime. Unions 
may be reluctant to antagonise their members in pursuit of an abstract collective good. 
Finally, it may be that unions are often forced to concede ground in this area, in order to 
maintain competitiveness, some jobs, and a presence at the firm in issue.   It is possible 
that a combination of all these explanations could explain this apparent anomaly.   




We begin our summary and discussion of these findings with a caveat.  This paper only 
examines formal NSWT and, as such, it does not take account of informal and unpaid 
NSWT that may be “expected” of employees, without it being formally recorded or 
reimbursed. Such unpaid NSWT is likely to be encountered in areas where employee 
rights are limited: in cases where the legal rights of employees are weak, and/or in 
organisations such as gang masters and family firms where, for very different reasons, 
informal ways of working regularly override formal contracts and employment law.  
 
We found that there were considerable variations in the nature of NSWT and we have 
explored the extent to which this was related to different forms of capitalism, sectoral 
mix, the presence/absence of employee voice and size of firms. This has been explored 
within a multivariate framework. We have noted that NSWT allows firms to adjust their 
workforce sizes, without having to engage in the hiring of new staff, and/or making 
excessive use of redundancies. At the same time, forms of NSWT may have other 
benefits, in that they reduce the need to spend on induction training and, in a climate of 
greater job security, provide fertile ground for the development of organisation-specific 
human capital. The use of NSWT also may enable expensive plant and machinery to be 
used over a longer time period and for services to be provided for a greater part of the 
working day.  
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Perhaps surprisingly, we did not find a clear link between variety of capitalism and the 
use of overtime. However, this is likely to reflect the fact that the latter embodies a wide 
range of practices, from the coerced extension of working hours to such an extent as to 
disrupt life outside work to modest increases and reductions that would enable firms to 
adjust the amount and cost of labour, without cutting or prematurely increasing jobs. 
Annual hours worked remain substantially larger in LMEs such as Britain and the US 
than they do in their coordinated continental European counterparts (Ewing 2003: 151; 
Williams and Adams-Smith 2006: 231-3) and it may be that our data is failing to identify 
less formal kinds of overtime working.  Weak regulation and weaker enforcement may 
mean that unofficial overtime is more likely to take place in LMEs (see Ackers and Al-
Sawad 2006; Hollinshead et al. 1999) and less likely to be detected by a survey of 
employers. However, in terms of hypothesis 1, shift-working did show an unequivocal 
distinction between the two varieties of capitalism we have considered. Shift work is less 
typical of CMEs. 
 
We found important sectoral variations in the usage of NSWT. Examination of the raw 
data illustrated that the proportions of the different forms of NSWT varied between 
sectors, thus confirming the first part of hypothesis 2. In testing the second part of 
hypothesis 2 we were able to show that, as expected, the service sector had a strong 
influence on the amount of overtime in LMEs but not CMEs.  The opposite was true for 
shift working and weekend working. Thus the second part of hypothesis 2 could be 
accepted in the case of overtime but rejected in relation to shift work and weekend 
working.  
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Finally, in relation to hypothesis 3, we found that stronger employee voice was associated 
with extensive use of overtime, the opposite of the relationship we had expected. Some 
suggestions as to why this outcome might have arisen were outlines earlier. 
 
Our study has pointed to a rich variation in the extent and nature of NSWT between 
countries. We found no evidence of uniform practices within any area of NSWT, 
reflecting the persistence of diversity.  It is evident that both “cooperative” non-standard 
arrangements, supplementing and supporting other flexible working practices and strong 
and effective employee voice, and poorly rewarded working over extended hours, 
including weekends, represent the product of a wide range of forces, including industry 
and spatially specific production paradigms, and informal and formal regulations.  The 
use of NSWT may represent a way of helping secure jobs (through allowing firms to 
adjust workforce sizes without firing or premature hiring) and, hence, promote greater 
organisational commitment, and engender organisation specific human capital 
development.  Alternatively, they may represent a semi-coerced form of “extra” working 
that may be unduly stressful, and disrupt social life.  
 
This would suggest that a fertile avenue for future research would be a closer 
examination of the range of formal and informal overtime working under the different 
forms of capitalism. 
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Fertile areas for future enquiry into the contrasts between NSWT under different forms of 
capitalism would include a closer examination of overtime (both formal and informal) 
and the relationship between the strength of employee voice, functionally flexible 
production and the relative length of work that employees may engage in outside of 
normal working hours. Extension of the evidence to other, particularly non-European, 
countries would be useful as would a comparison of our results with more sophisticated 
studies depicting more than two varieties of capitalism (Amable 2003; Jackson and Deeg 
2007; Whitley 1999).  Finally, there is a need for a very much closer examination of the 
relationship between work, non-work and non-standard working 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables 
 















UK 26.84 26.06 24.07 29.53 12.06 21.82 656 
Germany 9.53 18.33 28.71 29.53 15.93 23.81 222 
Austria 14.47 17.37 26.96 30.15 13.11 22.69 178 
Sweden 25.55 25.46 26.62 29.26 14.75 24.69 223 
Denmark 44.49 30.45 15.05 24.71 5.75 14.00 251 
 
* Proportion of employees in a firm working under specified work pattern  
 
Source: CRANET
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Continuous Variable     
Total employees  1905.0 9903 25 211063 
Dummy Variables     
Energy and water 0.025 0.16 0 1 
Chemical products 0.037 0.19 0 1 
Metal manufacturing 0.227 0.42 0 1 
Other manufacturing 0.210 0.41 0 1 
Building 0.039 0.19 0 1 
Retail and distribution 0.114 0.32 0 1 
Transport 0.054 0.23 0 1 
Banking and finance 0.125 0.33 0 1 
Personal services 0.009 0.10 0 1 
Health services 0.018 0.13 0 1 
Other services 0.024 0.15 0 1 
Education 0.006 0.08 0 1 
Social services 0.003 0.05 0 1 
Public administration 0.019 0.14 0 1 
Other 0.090 0.29 0 1 
Employee voice 0.749 0.43 0 1 
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Table 3 NSWT in five selected EU countries 
 
 Proportion of employees in a firm working under specified work 
pattern 
 Not used <1-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-50% >50% Total 
Overtime Working (extra time beyond an employees‟ normal time, added to 
a day or shift) 
n 172 301 226 239 297 295 1530 
% 11.2 19.7 14.8 15.6 19.4 19.3 100 
Shift Working (working one of a set of consecutive periods into which a 24 
hour working day is divided) 
n 448 237 144 152 225 324 1530 
% 29.3 15.5 9.4 9.9 14.7 21.1 100 
Weekend Working (working Saturday or Sunday) 
n 605 421 153 87 132 132 1530 
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 Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Mean 
Constant 20.60*** 9.87 21.86*** 10.71 3.96*** 2.49  
Total employees (000s) 0.03 0.44 0.06 0.86 0.21*** 4.01 1.91 
Energy and water -1.68 -0.37 -15.24*** -3.44 3.34 0.97 0.03 
Chemical products -0.84 -0.22 9.14*** 2.43 10.09*** 3.45 0.04 
Other manufacturing 3.56* 1.71 11.83*** 5.82 4.51*** 2.85 0.21 
Building 6.26* 1.66 -16.92*** -4.60 2.51 0.88 0.04 
Retail and distribution -0.10 -0.04 -7.61*** -3.07 20.79*** 10.76 0.11 
Transport 1.80 0.55 3.26 1.01 14.74*** 5.87 0.05 
Banking and finance -0.16 -0.06 -22.60*** -9.33 -2.67 -1.42 0.13 
Personal services -10.33 -1.41 -10.82 -1.51 21.62*** 3.88 0.01 
Health services -7.08 -1.35 2.74 0.53 21.90*** 5.46 0.02 
Other services -3.79 -0.81 -15.32*** -3.33 4.28 1.20 0.02 
Education -14.24 -1.57 -19.74** -2.23 -3.20 -0.46 0.01 
Social services -2.66 -0.20 -8.25 -0.63 15.48 1.51 0.003 
Public administration 2.38 0.45 -10.85** -2.11 6.89* 1.72 0.02 
Other 3.15 1.15 -8.82*** -3.30 5.45*** 2.62 0.09 
Employee voice 8.55*** 4.82 10.24*** 5.89 3.65*** 2.70 0.75 
CME -4.16*** -2.75 -4.15*** -2.80 -1.18 -1.03 0.57 
        
Dependent Variable Overtime  Shift work  Weekend working  
Mean 25.59  23.97  12.10   
Number of observations 1530  1530  1530   
R-squared 0.03  0.20  0.14   
   *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
 
Source: CRANET 
Nswtrevisedsubmission 40  
 
Table 5 Weekend Working by type of economy 
 
Economy  Proportion of employees undertaking weekend working 
 
  Not used <1-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-50% >50% Total 
LME n 272 162 70 36 60 56 656 
 % 41.4 24.7 10.7 5.5 9.1 8.5 100 
         
CME n 332 260 84 51 72 75 874 
 % 38.0 29.7 9.6 5.8 8.2 8.6 100 
 
Source: CRANET
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Table 6 Mean proportions of NSWT by Industrial Sector 
 
 Overtime Shift Work Weekend Working 
Energy and water 22.8 13.8 9.8 
Chemical products 23.9 36.9 16.5 
Metal manufacturing 25.4 28.3 6.5 
Other manufacturing 28.9 39.6 10.7 
Building 29.3 9 8.6 
Retail and distribution 23.6 18.5 26.8 
Transport 26.1 30.9 20.9 
Banking and finance 22.4 2.5 2.9 
Personal services 12.7 14.9 25.8 
Health services 17.2 29.8 28.3 
Other services 19.8 10.8 9.9 
Education 8.5 5.6 2.3 
Social services 23.3 20.8 22 
Public administration 27.1 18.2 17.4 
Other 26.6 16.9 11.1 
Total 25.5 23.8 11.9 
 
 
















 Table 7:  OLS Models of NSWT by Economy Type 
 
 
 LME   CME   LME  CME  LME  CME  
 Coeff. t-ratio Mean Coeff. t-ratio Mean Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant 27.43*** 9.95  17.02*** 5.13  19.45*** 6.68 21.33*** 6.81 4.67** 2.09 2.13 0.87 
Total employees (000s) 0.13 1.52 2.32 -0.08 -0.70 1.59 0.07 0.84 -0.02 -0.15 0.18*** 2.60 0.26*** 2.98 
Energy and water -0.17 -0.02 0.02 -0.35 -0.06 0.03 -15.99* -1.85 -14.85*** -2.89 -6.54 -0.99 6.93* 1.72 
Chemical products 3.89 0.45 0.01 0.76 0.17 0.05 9.83 1.08 8.97** 2.16 2.46 0.35 11.93*** 3.68 
Other manufacturing 0.59 0.20 0.24 4.03 1.42 0.19 8.82*** 2.81 14.62*** 5.45 3.24 1.34 5.37*** 2.56 
Building -8.40 -1.58 0.04 15.89*** 3.08 0.04 -18.94*** -3.37 -15.08*** -3.09 3.18 0.74 1.85 0.49 
Retail and distribution -8.91*** -2.46 0.13 4.46 1.28 0.10 -1.65 -0.43 -12.78*** -3.89 23.55*** 8.01 18.18*** 7.08 
Transport -6.93 -1.35 0.04 7.14* 1.68 0.06 3.29 0.61 3.72 0.93 11.61*** 2.79 16.34*** 5.20 
Banking and finance -14.10*** -3.95 0.14 10.08*** 2.99 0.11 -19.96*** -5.29 -23.87*** -7.49 -3.54 -1.22 -1.96 -0.79 
Personal services -19.44 -0.78 0.002 -6.47 -0.82 0.01 -19.46 -0.74 -9.85 -1.33 -4.69 -0.23 24.22*** 4.17 
Health services -8.98 -0.99 0.01 -5.52 -0.86 0.02 -6.22 -0.65 6.60 1.09 -1.70 -0.23 31.65*** 6.66 
Other services -22.38*** -2.60 0.01 3.36 0.60 0.03 -20.53** -2.26 -13.65*** -2.57 -3.81 -0.55 7.32* 1.76 
Education -25.42** -2.24 0.01 -5.70 -0.41 0.005 -14.83 -1.23 -25.25* -1.92 -2.10 -0.23 -5.04 -0.49 
Social services -20.03 -0.80 0.002 5.01 0.31 0.003 -33.32 -1.26 0.10 0.01 -0.82 -0.04 21.18* 1.79 
Public administration -5.75 -1.09 0.04 18.51 0.94 0.002 -12.82** -2.29 13.05 0.71 4.18 0.97 33.49** 2.31 
Other -9.36*** -2.44 0.10 11.63*** 3.07 0.08 -6.54* -1.61 -10.53*** -2.95 6.74** 2.16 4.08 1.46 
Employee voice 8.06*** 3.70 0.57 3.99 1.36 0.88 13.85*** 6.01 6.24** 2.24 4.09** 2.31 3.65* 1.68 
CME               
               
Dependent Variable Overtime   Overtime   Shift work  Shift work  Weekend work Weekend work 
Mean 26.84   24.66   24.07  23.89  12.06  12.13  
No. of observations 656   874   656  874  656  874  
R-squared 0.11   0.04   0.23  0.20  0.17  0.15  
   *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively  
 
Source: CRANET 
